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Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law 
Daniel J.H. Greenwood1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law is commonly viewed as merely an aspect of property, 
contract, or agency law.  The corporation, in turn, is variously described as 
a thing to be owned, a moment in the market consisting of continuously 
renegotiated arms-length contracts between equals, an agency relationship 
characterized by the one-sided fiduciary duty of agent to principal, a formal 
device for distributing risk among investors, or even an individual in its 
own right.  These metaphors contradict each other in many respects.  
However, each portrays corporations as private, individualized, egalitarian, 
and market-like, while hiding their organizational, institutional, political, 
and power distributing aspects.  The metaphors drive current interpretations 
of the law but remain in strong conflict with it, in part because corporate 
law historically stemmed from explicitly political conceptions.2  Although 
corporations are powerful governance and economic institutions, our 
corporate law metaphors have taught us to ignore the group and institutional 
characteristics of corporations and to treat them as powerless and passive 
players in the markets.   
As firms, corporations function as havens from markets; they exist and 
function best when they offer distinctive advantages over less 
bureaucratically organized systems.3  Because corporations succeed only by 
using the advantages of teams, they are also dependent on ordinary human 
understandings of justice in the context of teams.  In contrast, modern 
economically oriented normative claims that corporations exist solely for 
private wealth maximization4 threaten the viability of successful 
corporations.5  As Burke recognized over two centuries ago, the norms of 
pure profit maximization undermine the preconditions of profit along with 
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decency.6  Pursuit of wealth, like pursuit of happiness, is best done 
indirectly; successful corporations use our desires for meaningful work, to 
create useful products and services, and to participate in just institutions as 
their sources of strength.  By contrast, corporations that emphasize profit as 
their ultimate and proximate goal are more likely to go the way of Enron 
and other unsuccessful paragons of self-interest.     
II.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATIZED CORPORATE LAW 
Corporate law is the constitutional law of our great economic 
institutions—the large bureaucratic structures that create most of our wealth 
and run much of our lives.  Given corporate law’s centrality to our lives and 
our law, one might imagine that corporate law would be a distinct body of 
law with its own political or legal theory, internal norms, and unique 
doctrines.  However, this is not the case.  Law students study tort, contract, 
property, and criminal law as the key bodies of common law, and 
constitutional and administrative law as the key bodies of public law, each 
with its distinctive conceptual apparatus for understanding legal issues.  In 
contrast, corporate law is not regarded as a distinctive body of law, but 
instead is treated as a branch of other more fundamental areas of the law.  
Today, corporate law is most prominently thought to be based on contract 
law or agency law,7 although the law of directors’ fiduciary duties borrows 
from the law of trusts, and public law norms often treat corporations as a 
form of property.  Even as commentators disagree on which of these basic 
areas of law is most important to corporate law, they largely that corporate 
law is derivative of some other area of law that “really” explains it.  
All law depends heavily on metaphor.  Legal reasoning involves 
judgments that certain events are (or are not) similar; that norms applicable 
to one circumstance apply (or do not) to another; that similar verbal 
formulations describe (or do not) similar segments of reality; that a 
particular classification is (or is not) the most appropriate way to divide up 
an infinite normative world that comes with no predetermined boundary 
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markers.  Corporate law, perhaps because of its conscious borrowings from 
other areas of legal thought, is peculiarly transparent in its dependence on 
its metaphors.  The metaphors of corporate law so dominate our thinking 
that it is often the metaphors that determine the legal treatment of our 
largest institutions, rather than social usefulness, underlying reality or even 
conscious political debate.   
Corporate law and political discussion of corporations are dominated by 
four great privatizing metaphors, each of which puts publicly held business 
corporations on the private side of the fundamental divide between public 
and private.8  Each contends that corporations, like citizens, need to be 
protected from the government, rather than being, like cities or 
administrative agencies, governmental entities from which we need to be 
protected.  Each suggests that corporations are primarily market-like arenas 
of individual action and contractual agreement, characterized primarily by 
free agreement rather than coercive power.  Thus, corporations are 
distinguished, on the one hand, from governmental, political fora of 
collective debate, agreement, coercion and joint action, where the potential 
for illegitimate public power is well understood.  At the same time, they are 
also distinguished from status-based hierarchies of family, class, or race, 
where the potential for private coercion is well understood.  The 
consequences are dramatic.   
Liberal democratic republics protect citizens from governments that we 
fear may stray from their intended purpose of serving the population.9  
Democratic voting should assure that governments remain ultimately 
answerable to the population that ought to control them, helping to keep 
governmental institutions tied to the will and the interests of the governed.  
Simultaneously, liberal rights against the government protect individuals 
and minorities not only from out of control governments, but also from the 
majority of the population itself.  These fundamental rights create a 
protected space in which individual conscience or whim trumps both 
collective norms and the political process.10   
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Liberal democracies sharply distinguish between state and society, 
government and governed, means and end.  The state exists to serve the 
citizenry, not the other way around.  The state is a tool; citizens are ends in 
themselves.  The privatizing metaphors of corporate law mean that 
corporations are classified on the society side of this great liberal divide 
between state (the means or tool) and society (the end or goal).11  Our law 
treats corporations as values in themselves, entitled to be given the same 
consideration as citizens—as beneficiaries of government and not mere 
tools for a greater end.   
Republican democracy can exist only so long as the people control their 
government, including, most fundamentally, the right to change their mind 
about the ways in which it governs them.12  Therefore, municipal and other 
governmental corporations are, as a fundamental matter of republican 
politics, answerable to the people.13  They are subject to political debate and 
popular control, with no right to participate in the debate nor to assert rights 
against collective decision making.  If the people (or the legislature) decide 
to limit, change, muzzle, restrain, or even destroy them, the governmental 
institutions have no right to complain.14  
We treat business corporations differently.  Current First Amendment 
jurisprudence assumes that corporations, like citizens but unlike state 
agencies, are entitled to participate in controlling government.  Thus, 
corporations have rights to speak, lobby, contribute money (except directly 
to candidates out of the corporate treasury), advertise, mobilize, and 
petition, all of which can trump the people’s collective decisions.15 
Similarly, in liberal states, individuals have autonomy rights against the 
government.  The citizens are the ends of government; the government is 
merely a means to our end.  Here too, we treat business corporations as 
more analogous to citizens than to government.  Our business corporations 
have virtually every constitutional right against governmental control and 
regulation humans have, except for the right not to testify against 
themselves.16  Further, corporations have rights that human citizens lack, 
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such as free movement across borders and the right to choose their 
constitutive law.17  In contrast, citizens do not have constitutional rights—or 
even much in the way of statutory rights—against corporations.18  The 
Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens only against state action.  
Corporations, though they exist only by the law of the state and with its 
support, are not the state for constitutional purposes.19   
The consequences are dramatic.  If a municipal corporation (city) 
discriminates, the Constitution protects us against it.20  If a business 
corporation discriminates, the Constitution protects it against our attempts 
to stop it.21  If a municipality searches our desks or reads our mail, we can 
invoke the Constitution to create space for autonomous individual decision 
making.22  If a business corporation does the same thing, it can rely on the 
Constitution to prevent us from invoking governmental power to protect 
ourselves.23  If the population wishes to make its government more 
answerable—for example, by demanding that government decision makers 
disclose their records to the public—basic principles of self-government and 
law alike assume that this is the people’s privilege.24  If the same people 
wishes to make its business corporations more answerable using the same 
disclosure rules, the business corporation may raise privacy objections as if 
it were a dissident citizen seeking to maintain an autonomous space against 
the pressure of the majority, rather than a governing institution 
illegitimately resisting the will of its masters.25 
If corporations were viewed as akin to government entities located on the 
public side of the public-private divide, liberal, democratic, and republican 
principles would demand that they serve human interests.  Democratic 
theory would insist that corporate membership be defined in a way that 
encompasses the maximum number of people affected by corporate 
decisions, on a basis of equal membership without regard to status, 
particular roles, or wealth.  Republican ideals would demand that the 
leaders of institutions take the interests and will of the members as their 
goal, insisting that they treat those whom they rule as citizens rather than 
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subject, and they set the good of all, not just of particular roles (such as 
shareholders), as their ultimate end.  Liberal principles would require rights 
against the collective decision making process, as protections for individual 
privacy, security, and expectations against the overweening power of 
institutions and to instantiate the belief that our idiosyncrasies are due as 
much respect as our conformities.  But corporations are viewed as private 
entities.  Consequently, they have these rights and privileges against us, 
instead of the other way around.   
III.  THE METAPHORS OF CORPORATE LAW 
Four key metaphors ground the claim that corporations are private, 
individualistic, market-based, voluntary, and non-coercive, rather than.  
quasi-governmental, institutional, bureaucratic, collective, authoritarian, 
and coercive.  They are:  the corporation as property, contract, agency and 
individual. 
A.  Property    
The metaphor of a corporation as property treats business corporations as 
if they were analogous to real property owned by an owner or group of 
owners (i.e., the shareholders).26  Thus, the property metaphor conceals the 
degree to which corporations, as powerful governance insitutions, resemble 
the state.  Instead, this metaphor implies that protecting corporations is  
protecting real and personal property rights, and thus a central part of the 
liberal enterprise.  Of course, corporations are not things, but rather 
collections of human beings operating within a particular institutional 
framework.  We do not allow property in human beings, and indeed, 
property concepts cannot apply to human beings except by rough analogy.  
While an owner can control, destroy, or use his pencil or land largely as he 
pleases, no one can control and no one should be allowed to destroy or use 
another human being in that way.  Since corporations consist of human 
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beings operating under common direction, the rules of their governance 
must be based in political rather than property concepts.   
The property metaphor is only a metaphor in the simple sense that the 
law does not in fact treat corporations as property or their shareholders as 
their owners in any consistent fashion.  On the contrary, in publicly traded 
business corporations as we know them, shareholders own shares (which 
are property) but not the corporation.  They have political—not  property—
rights in corporations.   
Property rights which shareholders of publicly held corporations do not 
have, as a matter of corporate law, include all of the components of the 
“bundle of rights” that comprise actual property rights: 
• The right to buy, sell, rent, lease, acquire, inherit, divide or 
consolidate corporate property or the corporation itself 
• The right to control the corporation 
• The right to exclude other from the corporation or its property 
• The right to use corporate assets for the shareholder’s gain, pleasure 
or edification 
• The right to destroy or waste the corporation or its property 
• The right to consume corporate assets 
• The right to donate or give away the corporation or its property to 
charities, friends or relatives 
• The right to restrict ownership of the corporation to specified persons 
• The right to determine or change the purposes for which corporate 
property will be dedicated or the uses to which it will be put 
• The right to demand dissolution of the joint enterprise and separation 
of or monetization of the joint enterprise in order to allow an 
individual owner to separate from the collective 
• The right to enter into contracts on behalf of the corporation 
• The right to pledge or otherwise encumber corporate assets fro the 
benefit of the shareholder or the shareholder’s creditors 
• The right to invest corporate assets 
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• The right to grant easements, encumbrances, trusts or place other 
restrictions upon  the corporation or its property 
• The obligation to pay taxes on the property and income of the 
corporation 
• The obligation to make whole persons injured by the corporation or 
its property 
• The obligation to fulfill the corporation’s contracts or pay damages 
for failing to do so 
• The obligation to make restitution for, or accept punishment for, 
crimes or regulatory violations committed by the corporation or 
using its property 
It is the right to control one’s property that makes it a fundamental part of 
the liberal bundle of rights.27  Property creates a sphere of autonomy and 
privacy in which owners may behave as they please without concern for 
government, public opinion, or powerful neighbors.  But if a man’s home is 
his castle, the corporation in which he owns shares certainly is not.  
Shareholders lack the most fundamental of all property rights: the right of 
the owner to decide, without regard to the views of others, how to use the 
property.  Only the board of directors has the right to specify the purpose of 
the corporation or direct its operations.28  The shareholders have no right to 
direct the board to exercise its discretion in any particular way,29 and 
indeed, the directors have a fiduciary obligation to exercise their own 
judgment, which would be violated if directors followed shareholder 
instructions.30   
In the corporation, some of the basic property rights are held by the board 
of directors (or their agents) in their fiduciary capacities.  Other property 
rights are held only by the corporation as an entity, and several do not exist 
at all.  One of the most basic rights of full property ownership, for example, 
is the right to destroy.  This right is particularly important because it 
protects the basic autonomy right of owners to use property as they see fit 
without regard to the common opinion: if owners have the right to destroy, 
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no one can complain if they merely use the property unconventionally.  
Under our corporate law, no one has a right to destroy corporate assets.31  
Far from being autonomous and unanswerable, corporate decision makers 
are nearly always fiduciaries, bound to act in the interests (not the will or 
the whims) of the corporation, regardless of their personal preferences or 
values.32  
Shareholders do have more or less full property rights in their shares, 
including the rights to sell, destroy, consume, use, or pledge them without 
regard for the general opinion, and the obligations to pay taxes on them and 
be liable for their misuse.  Shares, unlike the corporation itself, are thing-
like in the sense that they have no will of their own, are inanimate, and so 
on.  Thus, it makes sense to treat shares as property. 
Conversely, the basic rights of shareholders with respect to the 
corporation are not property rights at all.  Most importantly, shareholders 
have a right to vote for the board, typically on the basis of one share one 
vote, and to vote to ratify or disapprove board initiatives in a limited 
number of areas thought to be particularly fundamental.33  Despite the anti-
democratic nature of these elections, restricted to only one type of corporate 
participant and weighted by wealth rather than personhood, the right 
remains political—an aspect of collective governance, not individual 
property.   
The shareholders do have a property-like right to a pro rata share of any 
dividend that the corporation has declared, but no right to have the 
corporation declare a dividend.34  If the corporation winds up, shareholders 
have a right to a pro rata share of any assets that remain after all other 
claimants are paid in full, but no right to demand a winding up and no right 
to determine what other claims the corporation may cause to exist.35  If 
shareholders are on the losing side of certain elections, they may have a 
statutory right to sell their shares to the corporation for a price determined 
by a statutory formula.36  However, these rights are not enough to make 
shareholders into owners—any more than the right of municipal ratepayers 
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to pro rata assessments of property taxes makes homeowners into owners of 
the city.   
There is one important exception.  A single shareholder that owns all of a 
corporation’s shares obtains control that looks like ownership of the 
corporation in something close to the normal sense.  To be sure, the 
corporation remains formally independent of its shareholder.  Thus, as a 
matter of law, only the board of directors can make the corporation’s 
decisions, and directors continue to have fiduciary obligations to exercise 
independent judgment even when the corporation has only a single 
shareholder.37  However, so long as the corporation pays its debts, only the 
sole shareholder would have standing to contest undue deference (and 
presumably the shareholder would have no interest in doing so).38  
Furthermore, a single shareholder may, in contrast to the normal rules, 
remove directors without cause even between normal annual shareholders’ 
meetings.39  In effect, these two deviations from standard corporate law 
make the directors function almost as if they were the sole shareholder’s 
agents, despite the formal requirements of the statutes.  The single 
shareholder exception, however, emphasizes the importance of the usual 
situation, in which directors are elected for a term and must maintain their 
independence from the share majority that elected them.  
Even in the exceptional situation, the law emphasizes that shareholders 
do not own corporations.  Piercing the corporate veil doctrine lurks in the 
never-too-distant background waiting to pounce upon shareholders that 
forget the difference between control and ownership.  If the board of 
directors or the shareholder acts as if the shareholder actually owned the 
corporation—for example, by using corporate assets for the personal benefit 
of the shareholder or otherwise failing to distinguish between corporate and 
personal property, or by neglecting the formalities of board control—the 
normal response of the courts would be to deny the existence of the 
corporation, deeming the shareholder to be the owner of a sole 
proprietorship.40  Shareholders usually view this result as a disaster: it 
The Metaphors of Corporate Law 283 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
means that the shareholder is responsible for the corporation’s torts, 
contracts, crimes, and taxes, just like any other owner of a business.  In 
short, a shareholder with full property rights in the corporation is a 
shareholder who no longer has a corporation.41 
The corporation, then, is not property in the ordinary legal sense, nor are 
its shareholders its owners.  However, the property law metaphor claims 
that the corporation is like property and shareholders are like owners in at 
least five critical aspects.  First, like owners, shareholders should be left 
alone within a fairly broad sphere of discretion, even though they have no 
autonomy or privacy interests in that sphere.  Second, like property, 
corporations should have a presumption of inviolability and governmental 
deference, with the burden of persuasion on those who would interfere, 
even though corporate decision making processes suffer from every 
deficiency of ordinary governmental processes without any of the 
legitimacy of democratic voting or limitations of fundamental rights.  Third, 
under the property analogy, corporations should be seen as private, even 
though public corporations are at least as large, collective, and powerful as 
most governmental agencies.  Fourth, when treated as property, 
corporations appear to need to be protected against undue governmental 
interference; private autonomy does not need to be protected against them.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the property analogy claims, without 
argument, that corporations ordinarily should be controlled by market 
forces with political intervention only at the margins.  No one would make 
such a claim about the city governments, even when they are (as is usual) 
organized in corporate form. 
The property metaphor rhetorically portrays corporations as foundations 
of human freedom instead of potentially powerful threats to it.  Only by 
escaping the power of the metaphor can we begin to think more intelligently 
about the ways in which corporate bureaucracies must be directed, 
restrained, freed, and controlled to work for human interests.  Corporations 
are political creations, making political determinations about collective 
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enterprises.  The property metaphor helps to conceal the obvious democratic 
deficit in corporate decision making processes.   
B.  Market and Contract 
If “corporation as property” is the leading metaphor of so-called 
“shareholder rights activists” and of lawyers and lobbyists seeking to 
protect corporations from regulation by the political process, the 
“corporation as a market governed by the law of contract” is the favorite 
metaphor of corporate law academics.  Contract is the classic center of the 
liberal conception of an ideal society of free, equal, and autonomous people 
joining together on the basis of consent and not coercion.42  Of course, the 
conditions under which contract is free and consent is not coerced are 
controversial and often the subject of intense debate.  Modern contract law 
is deeply conscious that few actual contracts fit Langdell’s central image of 
a fully negotiated agreement between equals.43  In reality, most contracts 
have virtually all their terms determined by social norms.  Whether consent 
is free or not is always a matter of degree, and in any event usually is 
limited to the choice of entering into a particular status relationship.44   
Still, the metaphor of the corporation as contract remains powerful, and 
the contract in the metaphor is Langdell’s, not Gilmore’s,45 or an 
economist’s rather than a sociologist’s or a lawyer’s—that is, the contract 
law that corporate law is said to be based on is contract in a purely 
imaginary world of equals freely consenting to all the terms of a mutually 
beneficial private agreement.  These contract metaphors evoke, consciously 
or unconsciously, Karl Marx’s famous description of the labor market as   
a very Eden of the innate rights of man.  There alone rule Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham.  Freedom, because both buyer 
and seller . . . are constrained only by their free will. . . . Equality, 
because . . . they exchange equivalent for equivalent.  Property, 
because each disposes only of what is his own.  And Bentham, 
because each looks only to himself. . . . Each looks to himself only 
. . . and just because they do so, do they all . . . work together to 
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their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of 
all.46  
The metaphor’s assimilation of corporate law is to this thin contract law 
suggests that corporate law is an arena of private agreement, not public 
governance.  On this view, we need not be concerned that employees 
experience the corporation as an external, coercive power: they are free 
even in the absence of a vote because they have consented, contractually, to 
the limits on their freedom.  Just as contract permitted Hobbes to find 
freedom in autocracy,47 it permits us to find democracy in corporate 
hierarchy.   We need not be concerned that our most powerful institutions 
are free to choose their own constitutive law without regard for democratic 
processes,48 or that they lack mechanisms for determining the collective 
views of those whose lives they affect as customers, sellers, employers, 
neighbors, or polluters—corporations, like the Hobbesian state, are simply 
the result of individual consent.  The metaphor of contract suggests that 
where individuals have agreed, politics is unnecessary.   
Contract images have the effect of concealing the organizational, 
governmental aspects of the firm.  Instead, the corporation either disappears 
entirely or appears to be a private individual.  Similarly, metaphors that 
portray the firm as if it were simply a spot market also make the 
bureaucracy, and the authority it exercises, disappear.  In Alchian and 
Demsetz’s classic contention,49 there can be no power inside a corporation 
because every participant has the market right to quit at any time: 
It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle 
issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to 
that available in the conventional market.  This is delusion.  The 
firm . . . has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action 
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting between any two people.50 
Paralleling the claims of Socrates’ laws,51 Alchian and Demsetz see 
continued participation as consent to all internal law, however seemingly 
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authoritarian.  Arbitrary dicta is transmuted into private agreement.  But 
while the right to emigrate, or quit, clearly limits the power of authority, we 
have long since abandoned any notion that rights of emigration alone make 
a society free.52  Anyone who thinks, like Alchian and Demsetz, that the 
firm “has no power of fiat,” clearly has never had a boss.   
The metaphors of market and contract portray the corporation as a mere 
moment in the market—a web of relations that is anything but firm.  They 
hide the reality of the firm as a distinctive enterprise with potentially 
interesting or problematic cultural norms of its own.   
In fact, however, corporate law has relatively little to do with the 
imaginary purely private contract law of the “nexus of contracts” metaphor.  
The basic corporate structure is entirely statutory, not contractual: entity 
continuity, entity liability, centralized governance, and the basic fiduciary 
duties of both directors and employees.  It would be extremely difficult to 
generate something similar by private contracting, because the corporate 
structure conflicts with basic contract norms on several levels.  Thus, 
contract assumes at least formal agreement, but corporate shareholders need 
not individually agree to any corporate decision.  Even when shareholders 
have the right to ratify board decisions, it is only by majority vote.  Nor 
could private contracting parties agree by contract to make someone else 
liable for their actions; outside corporate law, economic actors cannot 
decline tort liability simply by announcing their intention to do so.53  
Indeed, even where corporate law looks most contractual, it is not: the 
decidedly non-voluntary norms of agency, not any negotiated agreement, 
create the basic terms of the employee/employer relationship.   
Most importantly, the contract metaphor borrows its power from a spot 
market, in which actors meet momentarily to exchange product for cash.  
Corporations, however, arise precisely where spot markets are inadequate, 
as Coase taught us many years ago.54  Contrary to Alchian and Demsetz, it 
is the power of fiat that makes a corporation sufficiently efficient to 
compete successfully with markets despite the obvious deadweight of 
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bureaucracy and dividends.55  Corporations exist because planning is 
sometimes more efficient than markets; intelligent design (if it is intelligent 
enough) sometimes can succeed in the battle for survival against the forces 
of blind markets.  Corporations replace markets with bureaucracy, 
competition with plans, and evolution with design.   
The contract metaphor, thus, drives attention away from the most 
important fact about corporations—they are not so much moments in the 
market as moments out of the market.  The politics of liberal states is 
largely an ongoing debate about the relative roles of democratic politics, 
professional administration, and markets in our decision making 
structures.56  The contract metaphor places business corporations in the 
market camp, but they would better be seen as pre-democratic 
governments—administrative structures staffed by professionals but not 
answerable to democratic elections.   
In practice most aficionados of corporation-as-contract use the metaphor 
in the tradition of Dr. Pangloss57 via Herbert Spencer,58 asserting that 
whatever is must be right, that those who take the most must necessarily 
have contributed the most, and that those who lose deserve it.  Beginning 
with a presumption of equal bargaining power, they deduce that whatever 
results from the bargain must also be equal—if CEOs have increased their 
pay a hundredfold in a generation, and shareholders have doubled their 
returns, it must be because they are contributing more as well.  That there is 
no evidence of any increased contribution is of no matter—metaphor  
substituted for reason as a justification for reverse Robin Hood 
expropriation by the powerful.   
The contract metaphor is, however, more useful on a different front: it 
contradicts the claim of shareholder privilege implicit in the property 
metaphor.  If the corporation is a nexus of contracts among equals, then 
shareholders are just contracting parties like all others, entitled to no more 
than what they have contracted for.  Given that shareholders clearly have no 
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contractual right to any returns at all, the contract metaphor might suggest 
that shareholders should get nothing at all.59  
C.  Agency  
Agency, in contrast to contract, is inherently unequal.  Agents have 
fiduciary duties to act on behalf of their principals, not the reverse.60 
Servants obey and masters order.61  Agency metaphors are usually used in 
corporate law to suggest that shareholders should be in charge, even if they 
seem not to be.  If shareholders were principals and directors their agents, it 
would follow that directors should do what shareholders want, act in the 
shareholders’ interests, and manage the firm for the shareholders.  
Moreover, the firm itself would seem to be a sort of alter ego of the 
shareholders, just a tool that shareholders use to act more effectively in the 
world.   
All this is deeply confused as a matter of law.  Corporations are no more  
agents of their shareholders than they are their property.  Once again, 
piercing the veil doctrine makes this clear.  Courts consistently state that  
shareholders that use a corporation as their agent have so violated corporate 
law principles that the corporation is not entitled to legal recognition.62   
In any event, corporate law is quite clear that directors are principals, not 
agents.  As we have seen, they have a fiduciary duty to exercise 
independent judgment and may not follow shareholder orders.  Moreover, 
they serve according to the terms of the corporate charter and statute, in 
contradiction to the fundamental agency rule that master and servant alike 
have an inalienable right to terminate the agency relationship at any time.63  
In actual law, directors of public corporations are servants of a sort, but the 
master to which they answer is not a person but a legal fiction—the 
hypothetical interests of a corporation and imaginary (undiversified) 
shareholders isolated from every community and social nexus.  No one is 
entitled to tell the firm that it is time for it to focus on a goal other than 
survival and profit maximization.64 
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Still, the simple expedient of referring to shareholders as principals and 
directors as their agents makes the same point as referring to shareholders 
as owners and the corporation as their property.  Both metaphors contend 
that corporations ought to be operated on behalf of the shareholders, and 
both metaphors suggest that protecting corporate autonomy can be 
assimilated to protecting shareholder autonomy.   
On a different level, the agency metaphor functions to minimize the 
political aspects of the corporation.  Corporations govern their employees 
directly and their various investors, suppliers, customers, and other 
dependants in a looser sense.  In a democratic society, this raises an obvious 
question: why are not the firm’s subjects also its citizens?  How can a 
legitimate government determine that the interests of some of its subjects 
are utterly irrelevant (except insofar as it is useful to pretend they are not), 
and that the views of all need be given no weight?  If we thought of 
corporations as part of our ordinary government, the democratic deficit 
would be deeply troubling.   
The agency metaphor simply elides the democratic challenge.  On this 
view, employees are servants, not citizens.  As agents, they have no 
independent will, no independent interests, no entitlement to their own 
views.  Servants serve; they do not rule.  That is why democracies teach 
their legislators to view themselves as the people’s servants.  In the 
corporate world, we take the opposite approach.  We are the servants; the 
organization is the master. 
The agency metaphor deflects the liberal fear that governmental 
institutions may become autonomous power sources in another way.  Our 
CEOs are officeholders with obvious power over the rest of us, obviously 
able to appropriate vast amounts of social wealth for personal uses, 
obviously giving orders to subordinates in less-than-republican equality, 
obviously making decisions of enormous social importance with neither 
elections, political debate, nor strong legal limitations.  The agency 
metaphor helps to hide this reality.  In the agency metaphor, the actual 
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d7ecision makers are mere servants and agents, devoid of a will of their 
own.  The CEOs disappear as potential Caesars.  Instead, they are reduced 
to mere extensions of the needs, desires, and powers of their principal—in 
this case, the capital markets themselves.   
But corporations and their directors are not agents, so the agency 
metaphor merely conceals these problems rather than solving them.  Once 
we recognize that corporations are sources of power over citizens rather 
than necessarily servants to them, we must confront the problem 
straightforwardly.  For over two centuries, we have been acutely aware that 
as much as we need state institutions, we must also take care that they do 
not oppress instead of free us.  Corporate governance raises the same 
problems but has not received the same attention.    
D.  Personhood 
Corporations are legal persons in the sense that the corporation, not the 
people who run it or invest in it, is liable for its contracts and torts.  The law 
treats the corporation as the relevant legal actor, much as the classical 
international law system took cognizance only of sovereign states,65 as slave 
codes made slaves into legal non-persons,66 as family law in the days of 
coverture saw only male heads of households,67 and even today ordinarily 
hides children behind their parents.68  The metaphor of personhood, 
however, often goes far beyond recognition of the corporation’s legal 
standing.  Instead, the metaphorical description of a firm as a “person” 
becomes a rhetorical justification for treating the firm as if it had value 
independent from its usefulness to its participants.  But, firms are not the 
same as the people who make them up.  It is always an open question 
whether protecting the entity will protect or harm the people it affects: just 
as protecting the sovereignty of a state may or may not help its subjects, so 
too protecting the autonomy of a corporation has no necessary connection to 
the good of those dependent on it.   
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1.  Entities 
Sometimes the metaphor of personhood is taken quite seriously.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has granted corporations extensive 
constitutional rights with little explicit consideration of whether granting a 
right to a bureaucratic organization is the same as granting a right to a 
human citizen.69   
Thus, the Court has granted corporations nearly the same First 
Amendment rights as citizens,70 and more than foreign individuals,71, the 
only significant difference being that states may bar business corporations  
from contributing directly to individual political candidates in order to limit 
corruption.72  But there is no reason to think that granting First Amendment 
rights to corporations furthers political freedom or self-government.73  The 
issue is precisely analogous to granting the state rights against its people.  
Granting free speech rights to governmental agencies would increase the 
power of autonomous bureaucracies to stray from the desires or needs of the 
electorate.  It would be unlikely to improve our abilities to self-govern 
except in special circumstances.74   
Liberal political theory is based on the suspicion that governing 
institutions may prove to have interests and cultures of their own that can 
head them in directions other than those the people might choose.75  In the 
case of business corporations, the law demands that the institutional 
decision makers set aside their personal views in order to make decisions 
based only on a narrow and restricted view of corporate—not social— 
interests as defined by the law76.  Thus, while we may worry that 
democratic institutions will not reflect the views of their constituents, we 
have designed business corporations to guarantee that they will not.  
Treating business corporations as legitimate participants in a democratic 
polity should be deeply disturbing.77 
The person metaphor conceals the corporation’s groupness, obfuscating 
the internal difficulties of aggregate decision making.  Instead, it pretends 
that a firm is a single, unified, pre-Freudian actor.78  Thus, it again diverts 
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attention from the basic liberal suspicion of powerful governance structures 
able to diverge from the needs and desires of their participants.  Externally, 
it conceals the challenge that corporate lobbying and other participation in 
the general political process present to maintaining American democracy.  
Internally, it conceals the difficult corporate law issues of ensuring that 
corporate managers manage the firm in the interests of all its human 
participants.  
Even more disturbing, the metaphor portrays a tool as a goal, a means as 
an end.  The leap from “entity liability” to “legal personhood” to “person” 
ends by treating the business corporation as if it were a Kantian ultimate 
value: a person in the non-legal sense.79  Just as liberalism fought the fascist 
notion that the “state” or the “nation” is an end in itself, a value independent 
of its usefulness to its subjects, so too should it be horrified at the idolatrous 
notion that we ought to worship business corporations—which are mere 
human creations and bureaucracies at that.  Drawing aside the veil of 
personhood rhetoric is a first step towards bringing to the corporate sphere 
standard liberal suspicion of untamed power and awareness of the conflicts 
between individual and group. 
2.  Aggregates  
Sometimes, in contrast, the law looks right through the corporation, as if 
it did not exist.  In the tax area, for example, the corporate income tax is 
often denounced as “double taxation”80—as if the taxes paid by 
corporations were actually paid by their shareholders, which, of course, they 
are not.  Corporate income taxes are paid by the corporate taxpayer.  There 
is no particular reason to think that if publicly traded corporations were 
relieved of their social obligations they would turn their increased profits 
over to their shareholders.  On the contrary, in a competitive market, prices 
would adjust to reflect the lower private costs of production, and the 
reduced taxes would be appropriated by consumers.81   
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As another example, some constitutional decision view corporate 
property or corporate speech as if it were shareholder property or 
shareholder speech.82  As we have seen, this is wrong as a matter of state 
law.  Shareholders do not own corporate property or control corporate 
speech any more than they own or control the corporation itself.  The 
actions of the entity can never be simply attributed to its participants.83   
Like the agency and market metaphors, the aggregate version of the 
corporate person image tends to make the corporation vanish altogether.  
Again, this rhetorical move conceals the corporation as a governance 
institution necessarily raising the standard troubling issues of the use and 
restraint of power.  Just as we know that governments, even democratic 
governments, will only imperfectly reflect the general will—and that the 
general will itself is likely to be contradictory, conflicted, and 
problematic—we should assume that business corporations, which have no 
pretenses to democracy, will act in ways that the people who compose them 
never would.  Treating the whole as the same as its parts is no more 
reasonable here than would be treating a human being as the same as the 
chemicals of which she is made.  We need to escape the rhetorical trap of 
substituting the parts for the whole in order to intelligently discuss how to 
make the whole work in a way that maximally benefits us all. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The time has come to return to an older view.84  Corporations need to be 
reconceptualized in distinctively political terms.  Like other parts of our 
government, corporations are organizations we have created to be tools for 
our purposes—with a tendency to create their own independent internal 
norms, culture, and purposes.  In short, our tools escape our control.  The 
next step of the great liberal project—creating space for human freedom by 
restraining illegitimate power—must be understanding the great 
corporations as centers of power.  Simultaneously, we must remember the 
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most fundamental aspect of corporate law as it exists today: the corporation 
is a conscious creation of human creativity.   
Gertrude Stein famously complained of  a city in California that “there is 
no there there.”85  In the world of business, corporate law decides whether 
and when there is a there there—when there is an entity to act, to be acted 
upon, to be responsible, to be regulated.  It is corporate law that decides, for 
example, who is in charge of the sweatshops that human rights activists 
seek to eliminate.86  Today, as a general rule, corporate law leaves that 
decision entirely to the option of the regulated body.  That is, the 
corporation itself decides if it wants to be responsible for the sweatshop or 
any other given activity or distanced from it.  Consequently, we must 
always think of corporations as entities that, among other things, determines 
its own existence, boundaries and purpose.  This is an aspect of sovereignty 
that we deny even to our states.  If we are concerned about government as a 
source of power and not merely a restraint on private power, then we should 
be even more concerned about these self-governing, self-defining, 
autocratic, unanswerable, private and public power sources.   
The issue of who is in charge, and in charge of what, is central to a 
political conception of the corporation.  The privatizing metaphors of 
corporate law marginalize the problem.  If the corporation is no more than a 
series of private agreements between individuals, or an individual itself, 
seemingly we need not worry about how it behaves as a government-like 
autonomous actor.  Escaping the privatizing metaphors will help us to 
confront the true dimensions of our project.   
The political metaphors will help us to think about the corporation from 
the inside.  The publicly traded corporation is a powerful actor in our 
society.  Regulatory law seeks to set outer limits on its discretion.  Simply 
urging a corporation to profit maximize within the limits of the law is not 
enough—if only because part of the law setting those limits is corporate 
law’s permission for the corporation to seek to modify regulatory law to 
allow more private profit even at social expense.  Milton Friedman’s 
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simplistic call to allow business to tend to business must be inadequate so 
long as the law directs business corporations to maximize profits even by 
subverting the political process or changing the law.87   
Business corporations combine vast power with vast discretion.  Their 
decision makers have neither authority nor responsibility to consider the full 
implications of their acts.  Furthermore, the external restraint model suffers 
from a fatal internal flaw: corporate law grants corporations permission, and 
the market pressures them to take advantage of that permission, to use the 
very resources the law has granted them as tools to evade or change those 
very restraints.  So long as corporations have power, wealth, and the right to 
use that power and wealth to influence the political regulatory process, 
external restraints will never be sufficient.  Rather than simply restraining 
the corporation, we need to point it in the right direction: creating human 
freedom within the limits of market reality. 
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